Securitizing Migration after 11 March by Ross, James C.
Area: Demography & Population - ARI Nº 56/2004 
             3/26/2004 
 
 
Securitizing Migration after 11 March 
 
 
James C. Ross, Ph.D. ∗ 
 
 
 
Theme: This analysis draws on the recent experience of the United States to address 
perceived immigration risks since 9/11, and weighs the prospect of adopting similar 
approaches in Spain and the European Union following the 11 March terrorist attacks in 
Madrid. 
 
Summary: Immigration can be a source of unease in the developed world today due, in 
part, to the supposed linkage between international migration and global terrorism. Recent 
trends point to an accelerated growth of migration worldwide, whose networks terrorists 
are known to exploit. Migration, however, has only in the last decade risen to be a high 
security issue as state struggles against terrorists and other criminals have been 
extended to new targets, most notably immigrants. This analysis appraises the ‘problem’ 
of immigration in the US shortly before and after 9/11, and assesses a range of possible 
responses to the Madrid attacks on 11 March that could affect how Spain and other EU 
states deal with immigration and associated risks. In the final analysis, immigration and 
border authorities are well positioned to contribute to risk prevention with measures that 
improve the ability to gather and share intelligence needed to detect and detain terrorists 
and obstruct their plans, but restrictive ‘fortress’ responses and sweeping immigrant 
surveillance appear to hinder rather facilitate cooperation with key immigrant, especially 
Muslim, communities. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Introduction 
September 11 dramatized and reinforced a ‘publicly convenient link’ between national 
security and immigration, which has been used in the US and the EU to justify a wide 
range of external border control and internal surveillance measures directed at non-
citizens. Given the increasing likelihood that the 11 March attackers were foreign-born, 
national and European leaders will be forced to reassess immigration control and border 
management strategies. Now that Spain, like many EU countries, has become a popular 
immigrant destination, recent US experience in this area may provide important insight 
about different options for enhancing security. Do continuously expanding border 
obstacles and wider electronic surveillance protect us from would-be terrorists? What 
lessons does the US model suggest about the prospects and consequences of 
securitizing immigration to reduce the risks posed by would-be terrorists? 
 
The end of the Cold War brought attention to ‘new’ threats that filled the security void after 
the evaporation of a powerful external (state) threat to the security of Western countries. 
Throughout the 1990s, aside from fulfilling labour and population needs of receiving 
countries, migration from the developing to the developed world has been associated with 
a range of risks that threaten jobs, incomes, cultural integrity and national security. The 
‘problem’ of immigration has been magnified by the discovery that all of the 9/11 terrorists 
were foreigners of Middle Eastern origin, whose use of global migration networks and 
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legitimate immigration channels made it easy for political leaders and the media to meld 
immigrants and terrorists into a single category often called ‘terrorist aliens’. While legal 
immigration restriction, per se, has not been among the political fallout of the 9/11 attacks 
in the United States, the perceived need to securitize immigration and fortify national 
borders quickly became salient public policy responses to terrorism threats. 
 
The Bigger Migration Picture 
Human migration predates recorded history, as does, according to Hobbes, the natural 
right of self-preservation. The modern state arose, in part, to defend the security of 
territorially bound individuals who were otherwise prone to conflict and strife. The division 
of the world into a system of states, however, has produced the relatively new 
phenomenon known as international migration, whereby social, economic and political 
forces push and pull migrants in new ways that arguably threaten the security of the 
states themselves. Thus, states typically view immigration as an ‘externally motivated 
event’ that they are forced to respond to with a range of control measures. In other words, 
states seek to contain a force their borders, their economies, and their foreign policies 
have helped to produce. 
 
Traditionally, the concept of sovereignty has given states ultimate control over a bounded 
territory and its population, and the discretion to select and exclude immigrants, though 
the EU is pushing member states to harmonize their immigration policies. The purpose of 
immigrant exclusion changes with the times. States have, for example, defined 
immigration as a problem in terms of the alleged threats immigrants pose to the purity and 
strength of national identity, population and environmental sustainability, governmental 
welfare and other support programmes, and national and international security, the last of 
which concerns us here. 
 
While most modern democratic states uphold a generalized commitment to exit, they 
invariably set up a complex of barriers to entry. The contradiction between free exit and 
restricted entry has become even more pronounced since the demise of communism, 
especially as many traditional barriers to the movement of capital, goods and information 
have withered away with the emergence of regional trade regimes like NAFTA and the 
Euro zone. All through the 1990s, in fact, the more state borders have opened to 
international trade flows, the more restrictive illegal immigration policy in developed 
countries has become. In an age of ‘denationalizing’ globalization, the control of human 
entry is one of the few remaining domains where states can still exercise their strength by 
‘renationalizing’ immigration policies, a move that has taken on renewed urgency since 
the 9/11 attacks as states have responded with stricter entry requirements and tighter 
border controls, and sweeping electronic surveillance. 
 
To begin to address the security-migration nexus, it is important to look past staid realist 
assumptions that have been chiefly concerned with analysis of interstate issues. Fitting 
borders into emerging understandings of transnational networks associated with a global 
level of analysis, non-state actors and the spread of extreme Islamist terrorism, 
policymakers need to revise traditional understandings of borders as fixed, static entities 
that merely define the bounds of state sovereignty. Another approach is to recognize the 
global processes that territorial borders help produce in the first place, such as 
international migration, and the risks pertinent to those processes that highly restrictive 
border practices and exclusionary policies are not going to alleviate. 
 
Broader Border Challenges 
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As the smoke clears from the Madrid attacks, policymakers will begin to rethink 
immigration policy and border control as they renew their search for effective ways to 
respond to the threat of international terrorism and the Jihadist. A decade of enhanced 
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border security and immigration control measures in the United States, however, has 
done little to reduce the risk of terrorism, as 9/11 tragically demonstrated. 
 
In today’s broader security environment, free trade coexists with global terrorism. External 
borders, especially in the US and EU boundary countries, are increasingly seen as 
‘conduits for terrorists’. Neoliberal trade regimes like the NAFTA and Schengen accords 
have both fostered and complicated associated security issues. The ‘border securitization 
initiative’ that began Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper along the US-
Mexico border during the early-1990s introduced a new policy regime of boundary 
security practices that have done little to make Americans safer and a lot to make border 
crossing for undocumented labour migrants more dangerous. The near simultaneous 
passage and implementation of NAFTA, however, highlight the contrary trends towards 
expanding regional economic integration, on the one hand, and a concurrent tightening of 
labour flows, on the other. 
 
Proposals for a more open North America, though Janus-faced from the start, were 
brought to a sudden halt with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In both discourse and practice, the 
US has turned the border itself –and anything that crosses it– into a security risk, even 
though none of the nineteen hijackers entered the US illegally from Mexico or Canada. 
One major US response to 9/11 has been to drastically increase federal presence on US 
boundaries, making themselves more visible through the expansion of the border security 
apparatus. Beyond visibility, however, the US has also intensified physical and virtual 
scrutiny of non-citizens. 
 
The newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which assumed and 
expanded the responsibilities of the disbanded INS, has strongly linked border control to 
the struggle against terrorism. DHS director Tom Ridge portrayed US borders as ‘conduits 
for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, [and] illegal migrants,’ which was meant to 
underscore that ‘the new threats and opportunities of the 21st century demand a new 
approach to border management’ (2002). Furthermore, the DHS’s ambitious ‘Smart 
Border’ initiative aims to create a ‘seamless border’ that electronically integrates and 
identifies immigrants based upon ‘unfalsifiable’ biological features through the use of 
biometric identification systems (1). Critics contend that neither heavy border fortification 
nor intrusive electronic surveillance will do much to combat determined would-be terrorists 
and may ultimately result in a return to complacency and a false sense of security. 
 
While empirical links between restrictive border policies and national security remain 
inconclusive, it is a known fact that some terrorists have learned how to make legal 
immigration channels and legitimate immigrant communities serve their lethal Jihadist 
ends. International terrorism is a global problem that involves understanding complex 
transnational networks. Would-be terrorists no doubt exploit migration networks, flows, 
and communities, but it is important to distinguish that the terrorist –not the immigrant– 
constitutes the security risk. Nevertheless, attacks by foreign-born terrorists exacerbate 
an already growing tendency to view international migration through the myopic ‘prism’ of 
state security. In response to the Madrid attacks, for example, a leading spokesperson on 
domestic-security issues from the German opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
Wolfgang Bosbach, has promptly called on the government to ‘close evident security 
gaps,’ because the fight against terrorism ‘is inseparable from discussions on the 
immigration law’. Narrowing the focus too much, however, will distract policymakers from 
the wider array of human and societal security concerns that inhibit full integration of key 
Muslim communities and their participation as critical sources of intelligence. 
 
Post 9/11 US Domestic Security Practices to Avoid 
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Immigrants in the United States felt a strong backlash after the 11 September terrorist 
attacks. During the first weeks after the attacks, the media reported hundreds of 
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incidences across the nation where immigrants were being rounded up by the government 
just because they fit the ‘profile’ of suspected terrorists and their leaders. Attorney 
General John Ashcroft ordered the FBI to do a thorough investigation of all immigrants 
that had overstayed or otherwise violated their visas. The Justice Department had 
cultivated a ‘pervasive intolerance’ to any perspective that challenged government policy, 
and thus generalized an ‘atmosphere of fear’ where immigrants were afraid to speak out 
against alleged violations of their civil liberties by often overzealous law enforcement 
agencies bent more on revenge than justice. The bulk of the attention targeted Arab 
immigrants. 
 
Meanwhile, the FBI conducted ‘mass community sweeps’ in Muslim immigrant 
communities around the country with little measure of accountability or oversight. The 
scope of racial profiling and its tacit acceptance by the public produced an uncomfortable 
political climate, especially for Arab immigrants, whose mere presence seemed to be 
cause enough for suspicion. Moreover, the USA Patriot Act, which Congress hastily 
passed on 25 October 2001 granted new and unprecedented detention authority to the 
Attorney General based on vague and unspecified predictions of threats to national 
security. Specifically, the law permits the detention of non-citizens facing deportation 
merely based on the Attorney General’s certification that he has ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ the immigrant endangers national security. Although immigration or criminal 
charges must be filed within seven days, these charges need not have anything to do with 
terrorism, and could be minor visa violations of the kind that in the past would not result in 
detention at all. 
 
What is more, non-citizens ordered removed on visa violations could be indefinitely 
detained if they are stateless, their country of origin refuses to accept them or they are 
granted relief from deportation because they would be tortured if they were returned to 
their country of origin. It is very rare that once the United States has suspected one of its 
foreign nationals of terrorist involvement that the country of origin will agree to take him or 
her back. One of the most far-reaching and controversial implications of the USA Patriot 
Act has been the widened discretion to indefinitely detain non-citizens who have never 
been convicted of a crime but whose political beliefs and associations are sufficient cause 
to consider a foreign national a threat under the bill’s expanded definition of terrorism. 
 
The Act outlines an extraordinarily broad definition of terrorism that covers virtually any 
violent activity taken by a group, which allows for non-citizens to be detained and 
deported based upon their association with that group. The onus then falls on the non-
citizen to prove that his or her association was not intended to further terrorism. 
Immigrants who provide assistance to such groups, such as paying membership dues, 
run the risk of detention and deportation. After 9/11, the government detained more than 
1,200 people and has refused to say who they were or what happened to all of them. 
Acting on tips, sweeps and profiling, however, has failed to produce terrorism-related 
convictions against the detainees apprehended using these techniques, but has 
succeeded in further alienating the Muslim community as a key player in the struggle 
against Islamist terrorism. 
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Acting out of political expediency, the US government embarked on far reaching and 
intrusive immigration initiatives that, as far as antiterrorism measures are concerned, have 
not made Americans any safer. On the contrary, drastic measures taken against non-
citizens may communicate an image of security that does little to detect and detain would-
be terrorists. Government action against immigrants also undermines fundamental civil 
liberty principles through violations of due process of law, denied access to legal counsel 
and by often subjecting detainees to closed hearings for ‘national security’ reasons. 
Moreover, the US government has relied heavily on the use of national origins in their risk 
assessments of individuals, rather than on intelligence-driven criteria. 
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Profiling stigmatizes, intimidates and alienates targeted immigrant communities by 
discriminating against individuals on the basis of religion or national origin instead of 
patterns of individual conduct. Besides undermining civic values, profiling hampers 
cooperation with targeted communities, compromising behaviour-based law enforcement 
practices and intelligence gathering, which has proved far more successful than profiling 
for apprehending suspected terrorists. In short, fear and victimization accurately 
characterize the post-9/11 reality for many Arabs and Muslims residing in the United 
States, a situation that Spain and the European Union, with roughly 500,000 and 12 
million Muslims, respectively, would do well to avoid. 
 
Spain’s New Immigration 
Immigration was a backburner issue in Spain during the second half of the 1980s and into 
the early-1990s; meanwhile a demographic shift from an immigrant sending to immigrant 
receiving country was occurring. The early 2000s point to even more dramatic migration 
inflows and extended media coverage, thus raising immigration high on the list of public 
concerns and the political agenda. Immigration had finally come of age in Spain, even as 
constructive public policy and open attitudes to address immigration issues continued to 
lag behind. Then came modern Spain’s day of infamy: 11 March 2004. 
 
It is especially important to note the demographic dimensions of migratory flows to Spain, 
especially in light of the national origins of the initial suspects of the 11-M attacks and the 
increasing evidence that points to al-Qaeda involvement. In general terms, while still 
relatively low compared to traditional immigrant receiving countries, the change in foreign 
stock in Spain as a percent of total population from 1.3% in 1995 to 3.1% by 2002 is 
significant in absolute terms, and in terms of the ‘visibility’ of immigrants (see Trends in 
International Migration, 2003). 
 
Moreover, just looking at the gross number of resident immigrants indicates important 
changes as well. How political leaders and the media report these changes has already 
had a negative effect on public perceptions of immigration, which could be exacerbated in 
the likely event that investigators find conclusive evidence that links Islamist terrorists to 
the Madrid attacks. Between 1995 and 2001, for instance, the resident immigration 
population increased from 499,773 to 1,109,060, more than a 110% increase in six years 
according to the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs. Importantly, the proportion of resident 
immigrants from non-EU countries increased substantially during the period, from 53.59% 
in 1996 to 70.55% in 2001. 
 
Another important demographic factor to bear in mind is the rising number of immigrants 
coming from developing countries. The ratio of resident immigrants coming from 
developing and developed countries has shifted from virtual parity in 1999 to 63.04% in 
2001 by factoring in the Human Development Index (HDI) of the sending countries. Most 
significant to the current situation, however, is the fact that among the non-EU developing 
countries, Morocco has by far the greatest number of resident immigrants living in Spain, 
with almost a quarter of a million in 2001. 
 
Alternative Frameworks 
How does the EU meet ‘new’ security demands while ensuring the protection of civil 
liberties, immigrant rights and cooperation among member states? Immigration policy may 
supplement counterterrorism measures, but we have learned from the US case that knee-
jerk responses that try to ‘seal’ borders and intimidate immigrants are not only costly, 
ineffective and damaging, but promote an exclusionary ‘fortress’ image that does little to 
reduce the risk of terrorism. 
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One of the fallouts from the Madrid attacks will likely be renewed and concerted efforts to 
securitize migration. With some one million undocumented foreign nationals currently 
living in Spain without work contracts, whose low cost labour is a structural necessity of 
the Spanish and larger EU economy, emphasis would be better placed on regularizing 
their status and improving employer compliance with immigration laws. This would have 
the dual effect of, first, allowing immigration authorities to collect valuable information 
about who is residing in the country, which, when appropriate, could aid counterterrorism 
efforts and, second, protecting immigrant rights. 
 
Policymakers in EU member countries should bear in mind two general principles as they 
consider specific policy solutions to reduce the risk of terrorism. First, in an increasingly 
interconnected and networked world, unilateral approaches to international migration will 
leave a mismatch of contradictory national policies that are inconsistent with the 
consolidation of a single European market and susceptible to entry shopping and lax 
management. An integrated Europe against global terrorism must start by managing 
migration multilaterally at the European level in conjunction with EU counterterrorism 
efforts pursued by the EU Justice of Home Affairs (see JHA MEMO/04/59). The EU could 
also work productively with the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM), the 
endpoint being a new migration regime that elevates the status of global migration above 
the terrorist and criminal elements that exploit international migration networks and 
national immigration policies. 
 
The second general tenet is that policies to securitize migration towards the goal of 
reducing terrorism risks should go hand-in-hand with measures to ensure human and 
societal security. The goal here is to recognize that, in addition to the scores of 
immigrants that were killed and hundreds injured in the 11 March attacks, Muslim third-
country nationals will likely suffer the next round of repercussions. It will take sustained 
educational and public information campaigns to counter the heightened fear and 
expression of Muslim ‘otherness’ that will follow growing evidence that the Madrid 
bombers were tied to a Moroccan terrorist group, with alleged links to al-Qaeda, which is 
also thought to have been responsible for the terrorist attacks in Casablanca last year. In 
other words, it is important for lawmakers to remember that the migration-security nexus 
includes xenophobia, racism and a generalized fear of the other, which are expected to 
intensify following the Madrid attacks. 
 
Conclusion: In sum, key to an alternative framework is a refocusing from physical border 
management to concentrate more resources on the strategic use of information, 
intelligence and multilateral cooperation. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, US law 
enforcement authorities executed a policy based on racial/ethnic profiling and border 
militarization to capture would-be terrorists. Profiling has proved a crude and inadequate 
measure that leads to discrimination and less rigorous scrutiny of individuals, according to 
many law enforcement experts. Rigid border security practices will not stop determined 
terrorists either, and diverts valuable resources away from more effective options like 
enhanced pre-clearance entry programmes, better intelligence-gathering, greater 
coordination of multidisciplinary information-sharing and operational law enforcement 
cooperation at the EU level. Finally, the 11 March terrorism attacks should compel EU 
policymakers and national governments to speed up the harmonization of immigration 
policies and shore up public education and integration programmes. As Europe looks to 
securitize migration after the Madrid attacks of 11 March, we may be wise to consider the 
words of political philosopher Seyla Benhabib: ‘Whether the dream of the Euro-federalists 
to establish a multifaith, multinational, and multicultural Europe becomes a reality 
depends in large measure on the treatment of the foreigners in its midst’ (2). 
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(1) For an extended discussion about biometric identification technologies, see Ross 
(2003) at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/407imp.asp. 
(2) Seyla Benhabib, ‘In Search of Europe’s Borders: The Politics of Migration in the 
European Union’, Dissent (Fall 2002). 
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